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Abstract
The current fleet of Common Support Equipment (CSE) is faced with a $2 billion
funding disconnect that threatens nine of the twelve Core Functions of the United States
Air Force. The purpose of this research is to identify and explore the factors within the
sustainment, acquisition, and maintenance communities that exist as barriers to efforts to
modernize CSE across the Air Force Logistics Enterprise. Using a qualitative, grounded
theory methodology, this study explores the responses of interviewed Aviation Support
Equipment managers responsible for the sustainment and modernization of CSE. The
analysis exposed significant barriers to current modernization efforts, resulting in
expensive, outdated, duplicative, and unreliable equipment in use across the Air Force.
This research concludes that the Air Force must change the way CSE is administrated,
funded, and culturally understood to prevent future mission degradation and failure.
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THE OBSTACLES TO THE MODERNIZATION OF COMMON SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
I. Introduction
Background
The Air Force pays $150,000 to refurbish a 1970s-era MJ-1 “Jammer,” though a
brand new one costs $85,000 (Richards, 2020). Even more wasteful, the E4-B
“Nightwatch” National Airborne Operations Center runs one of its engines around the
clock on alert because the ground power cart available is too unreliable. This results in
the unnecessary consumption of $1.5 million of fuel per month (Haralson, 2020). The
HH-60G “Pavehawk” aborts 2% of its missions due to preventable radar altimeter
discrepancies—the available commercial test set is not approved for Air Force purchase
(Ray, 2020). These examples provide a small sample of the current state of Air Force
Aviation Support Equipment: expensive, unreliable, and outdated.
A large portion of equipment in-use today was designed and built in the 1960s,
70s, and 80s—long before most currently-serving Airmen were born. This equipment
breaks frequently and necessitates “Flightline Heroics” to accomplish the mission (Bobic,
2018). Maintenance technicians and operators across the Air Force are keenly aware of
the obstacles to their mission; hampered by bureaucratic processes and funding
constraints that prevent their highest priorities from being addressed (Bobic, 2018).
Aviation Support Equipment (AvSE) performs a vital role in the weapon system
hierarchy of every aircraft (Swain, 2021). The DoD defines AvSE as: all equipment,
whether mobile or fixed, necessary to support the operation and maintenance of a weapon
system in every operational circumstance, environment, and level of maintenance
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(Taylor, 2020). Common Support Equipment (CSE) consists of all items of AvSE that are
utilized by multiple weapon systems. CSE’s current portfolio contains more than 533,000
end items, with 53,000 unique stock numbers valued at over $13 billion (Sillence, 2020;
Haralson, 2020).
Nine of the twelve Core Functions of the Air Force are directly supported by
CSE. Without adequate CSE support, the missions of Air Superiority, Command and
Control, Education and Training, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance, Global Precision Attack, Nuclear Deterrence Operations, Personnel
Recovery, Rapid Global Mobility, and Special Operations are not possible (Sillence,
2020).
Three distinct Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) organizations hold
responsibility for the management of CSE under the authority of program action directive
(PAD) and Air Force Instruction (AFI) HQ AFMC/A4 (PAD 07-13), AFSC/635 SCOW
(PAD D16-03), and AFPEO/ACS (AFI 63-101_20-101) (Sillence, 2020). These three
organizations form the management “triad” responsible for the cradle-to-grave lifecycle
management of all CSE assets.
Functioning as the Weapon System Team (WST), HQ AFMC/A4M (referred to as
A4M), provides Lead Command authority and management by establishing policy and
guidance, Technical Order (TO) management, and requirement validation for spares,
prioritization, and depot repairs (Sillence, 2020). The members of the A4M team provide
the vision and direction for all AF CSE assets.
The second organization in the triad is the 635th Supply Chain Operations Wing
(SCOW). Responsible for parts management of fielded CSE, the SCOW coordinates
2

current assets’ sustainment through spare parts acquisition (Sillence, 2020).
Redistribution Orders (RDO) leveling and transferring assets are also accomplished by
the SCOW.
The Air Force Program Executive Office Agile Combat Support (AFPEO/ACS)
forms the third leg of the CSE triad (Sillence, 2020). The Support Equipment and
Vehicles (SE&V) office under AFPEO/ACS provides CSE items with single-source
management of TO accuracy, cybersecurity, and obsolescence prevention (Sillence,
2020). Intended to maximize commonality and leverage efficiencies of scale, SE&V
provides the acquisition and modernization oversight of all CSE items (Sillence, 2020).
These three organizations refer to CSE modernization as the procurement of “new-new”
assets and the acquisition of replacement items as “new-old” (Richards, 2020; Haralson,
2020; Sillence, 2020; Swain, 2021).
As the triad has addressed the field’s concerns in recent years, managers at all
enterprise levels have been forced into obstacle cycles, preventing them from
modernizing CSE and hampering the execution of flightline maintenance. Obstacle
cycles, the focus of this research, are hurdles that exist in the process of modernization.
These obstacles obscure the process, making a successful modernization project highly
unlikely. A thorough review of the existing literature has revealed a gap in the
conversation about AvSE—discussion about the obstacles to CSE modernization.
To eliminate ambiguity, modernization must be defined for the purposes of this
study. The acquisition community refers to Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 63-128 for key
definitions. The term most similar to the common use of modernization in AFPAM63128 is “modification,” defined as “a change to the form, fit, function, or interface of an
3

in-service…AF asset” (Department of the Air Force, 2014). The policy also defines
modifications as activities that provide new capabilities, improve reliability, reduce cost,
and enhance operational effectiveness. In this thesis, the term “modernization” is
interchangeable with the AFPAM63-128 term “modification.”
Based on interviews, site visits, and data provided by Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs), this research will outline the critical obstacles to modernization, discuss the
likely consequences of an outdated fleet of CSE, and provide recommendations to
catalyze the modernization of CSE.
Problem Statement
Current policies and procedures have produced an outdated, unreliable CSE fleet
with a funding disconnect of $2 billion (Haralson, 2020). Capability gaps exist that
prevent the loading and employment of next-generation weapons (Sillence, 2020). The
Air Force does not publish a consolidated list of the AvSE required to support its
missions and is unable to produce hard metrics to articulate priorities, requirements, and
capability gaps, relying instead on anecdotal evidence (Haralson, 2020). The maintenance
“no-fail” mentality has masked deep problems in the current equipment fleet, obscuring a
clear view of the actual situation (Bobic, 2018). Communication about AvSE needs is so
ineffective that the Air Force paid a contractor to facilitate a consolidated priority list
between an owning MAJCOM and front-line maintainers (Layne, 2020). These problems
do not exist due to a lack of commitment by managers and maintainers, but due to policy
requirements that force change-agents into endless cycles, only to be met by an obstacle
that prevents modernization.
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Purpose Statement
The purpose and primary goal of this analysis is to identify and explore the
obstacles to modernization faced by SMEs in the CSE logistics enterprise through
interviews and data collection. The resulting analysis will recommend policy and funding
changes to remedy shortfalls in Common Support Equipment modernization objectives.
Research Questions
RQ 1: What are the top five obstacles to Common Support Equipment modernization?
RQ 2: What are the consequences to the Air Force mission and objectives due to those
obstacles?
RQ 3: What actions should Air Force policy-makers take to address those obstacles?
Research Focus
A review of the current National and Air Force priorities will provide context to
logistics and acquisition professionals’ operating environment. The literature review of
Air Force Support Equipment instruction and policy will provide the written bounds of
the management triad. Previous AvSE research is then explored to ensure a thorough
review of the topic. Subsequently, the methodological tools and data collection process of
this analysis are described. The paper concludes with research findings, limitations, and
areas for future research.
Methodology
This research was accomplished using qualitative interviews and the collection of
current Air Force documents and other materials. The qualitative approach employed was
influenced by the framework described in the books: Research Design: Qualitative,
5

Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches and Practical Research: Planning and
Design (Creswell, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).
Assumptions
This thesis assumes that each interviewed AvSE manager described the
enterprise’s actual state and that the described events, numbers, and details represent an
accurate perspective. The analysis is founded upon a lack of personal agenda on the part
of the interviewees. Additionally, it is assumed that outdated AvSE directly affects a
unit’s ability to deploy and effectively execute its tasked mission, based on the
conclusions of previous authors (Barrett, 2015; Bayer, 2003; Bobic, 2018; Leighton,
2017; O'Donnell & Forster, 1975; Williams, 1991). Finally, the proliferation of peculiar
equipment and supplies is assumed to increase cost, based on prior research (Leighton,
2017; Casey, 2018).
Limitations
The scope of this research is focused on the modernization of Common Support
Equipment, with no discussion of the modernization or acquisition of Automatic Test
Sets. The acquisition process for current assets, or “new-old,” is not considered. Rather
than focus on how the enterprise procures replacement CSE, this thesis explores the
procurement of “new-new” equipment. There is no discussion of equipment data
collection or interpretation as other projects have already recommended increased data
with current contracts in place to address that gap. Finally, this research has no intention
of quantitatively proving CSE’s importance to the Air Force mission.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter shapes the context surrounding the operating environment of the
support equipment management enterprise. To build the foundation of the modernization
milieu, national and departmental policy will be summarized and discussed. The relevant
governing regulations will also be outlined, providing the major actors’ roles and
responsibilities and specific relevant definitions. This chapter will conclude with a survey
of AvSE research.
National and Departmental Policy
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America provides
the strategic vision for the Executive Branch of government (Trump, 2017). Until the
President publishes a new NSS, every branch’s policy should subordinate to this vision,
working towards a practical execution of the national priorities. Acknowledging the
changing geopolitical landscape, the 2017 NSS describes the critical threat to American
hegemony: the rise of China and Russia as peer adversaries. To meet these threats, the
President named modernization his top priority for action by the Department of Defense
(DoD).
Modernization efforts for the United States military should be undertaken with the
goal of retaining overmatch: the ability to defeat any adversary in any situation (Trump,
2017). The military’s advantages should be clearly understood by potential adversaries,
with modernization focused on exploiting additional capabilities. Not to be singularly
focused on hardware, the DoD is directed to eradicate administrative obstacles to

7

modernization—receptive to readily-available commercial technologies and practices.
The NSS expects the DoD to rapidly test, benchmark, and deploy cutting edge
capabilities.
The President named acquisition reform as the second military priority. Echoing
the modernization directive, the NSS expects the DoD to reduce cost through innovative
non-traditional technology sources (Trump, 2017). The policy directs a refreshed focus
on maintenance and logistics, recognizing the vital role these functions play in the
national ability to rapidly deploy with a resilient, agile force.
The National Defense Strategy (NDS), signed by the Secretary of Defense,
provides DoD-specificity to the President’s NSS. Published in 2018, Secretary Mattis’
NDS acknowledges, “we cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with
yesterday’s weapons or equipment” (Mattis, 2018). To rebuild the lethality of the
American fighting force, key capabilities must be modernized.
The ability to employ forces in smaller pockets throughout the world, prioritized
by the NSS, is reemphasized in detail. The NDS guides the military away from a
traditional deployment of large, consolidated, uncontested infrastructure towards a
dispersion of assets. Decentralization of assets necessitates the prioritization of mobility
capability and prepositioned employment equipment. The NDS describes the force of the
future as one with a light logistical footprint with fluid adaptation to an unrelenting,
capable threat.
The current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Charles Brown Jr., published
Accelerate Change or Lose in August 2020. He asserted the Air Force must adapt to new
technologies and changing environments—challenging the status quo of current
8

operations (Brown, 2020). Action Order D of General Brown’s directive calls for Airmen
to “identify systems and programs that are outdated…to make way for capabilities that
will make us competitive in the future high-end fight” (Brown, 2020). This directive is
clear: the force must modernize.
The policy directives of both the NSS and the NDS prompted the Commanders of
the Air Force’s Major Commands (MAJCOMS) to codify the Air Force’s modernization
objectives (AMC/CD, et al., 2019). Paragraph 3, Item t. directs Air Force Materiel
Command (AFMC), in conjunction with affiliated MAJCOMs, to “prototype, acquire and
deploy experimental equipment,” including Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) as a
subset of CSE. In support of this effort, current AGE capabilities must be evaluated in
both form and function to determine employment efficacy.
The modernization of CSE directly supports the Air Force’s modernization
priorities, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States. Without
parallel modernization efforts throughout the force, the United States military has no
assurance of victory in a peer-level conflict.
Governing Regulation
The next subsection will summarize the governing regulation of CSE to provide
the bounds of acquisition and procurement. AFI63-101/20-101 provides the backbone
policies and procedures for acquiring all items intended to satisfy the warfighter’s
requirements (Department of the Air Force, 2020). Program Managers (PM) hold the
ultimate responsibility for their respective acquisition programs and use AFI63-101/20101 as their operating manual. To “provide efficiency and reduce cost,” the AFI prefers
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the employment of standardized support equipment or CSE. The PM should minimize the
proliferation of equipment unique to a single system, subjected to that particular system’s
employment requirements.
Paragraph 7.17.1 specifically directs the PM to acquire, “to the greatest extent
possible,” support equipment that is common with other systems, service branches, and
programs (Department of the Air Force, 2020). After careful consideration of all systems
currently available in the Air Force inventory, if a PM determines that CSE assets do not
meet the needs of a program, a waiver to acquire PSE is required. Waivers must be
submitted to the Support Equipment Product Group.
If a PM is unable to satisfy the program’s requirements through CSE, the Support
Equipment Recommendations Data process through AFMC is initiated as the last
alternative (Department of the Air Force, 2020). In summary, AFI63-101/20-101
provides clear, unequivocal guidance for Program Managers to maximize the use of CSE
during the acquisition of any new program.
Relevant Research
Multiple studies have documented CSE’s importance over the last 45 years
(O’Donnell & Forster, 1975; Nauta & Ward, 1985; Williams, 1991; Leighton, 2017;
Bobic, 2018; Casey, 2018). Each has examined a different aspect of the CSE enterprise,
including acquisition, management, and employment. O’Donnell and Forster (1975),
commissioned by the Logistics Management Institute, investigated AGE’s acquisition
process. The researchers employed a series of case studies to determine the current
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acquisition process’s ability to meet the needs of the warfighter through AGE
procurement.
O’Donnell and Forster (1975) selected ten defense systems for analysis, with 76
specific items identified as case study subjects. From the case study subjects, 17
problems were classified with 20 causes. Though the authors determined that the
acquisition process provided a sufficient system for acquiring support equipment, the
process proved ineffective for complex electronic test.
Of the key recommendations, three are especially relevant to the current research
topic. The first is the finding that the MIL-HDBK-300D, the central registry for support
equipment employed by the DoD, was ruefully incomplete. Of the selected case study
items, 73% were not included in the MIL-HDBK-300D, and 100% of observed electronic
test equipment was not included (O'Donnell & Forster, 1975). The Air Force did not
address the issue, and Chapter IV discusses how a lack of CSE documentation provides
an obstacle to modernization.
O’Donnell & Forster (1975) also identified the Aerospace Ground Equipment
Recommendations Data (AGERD) process, a precursor to the current Support Equipment
Recommendations Data (SERD) process, as a reform candidate. The authors found that
20% of selected case studies did not use the AGERD, and governing policies did not
effectively mandate the use of the process. Additionally, the authors observed that the
average processing time for an AGERD was 200% of the allotted amount, providing
further evidence for program reform. The lengthy, ineffective AGERD process
transformed into the equally toothless SERD, and resulted in the current proliferation of
PSE.
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Finally, the study recommended creating a central governing body for the
acquisition and management of support equipment. This office would facilitate
communication between System Program Offices (SPO), store feedback data about
purchased systems, and ensure the proper execution of a rigorous SERD process
(O'Donnell & Forster, 1975). Though the authors recommended these changes 46 years
ago, the same obstacles plague AvSE management today.
Nauta and Ward (1985), also commissioned by the Logistics Management
Institute, focused on test equipment management policies. Though a slightly different
resource than CSE, test equipment management overlaps significantly with CSE
(Haralson, 2020). The study recommended changes to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics to address the low reliability, usability, and
functionality of test equipment reported by end-users (Nauta & Ward, 1985).
The first change recommended by Nauta & Ward supported O’Donnell &
Forster’s 1975 recommendation for a revised central registry of all employed AvSE. The
central registry would serve as a “DoD-wide preferred items list,” providing a single
reference point for PMs during the acquisition process and reducing the proliferation of
unique items (Nauta & Ward, 1985). Additionally, the study recommends the
standardization of test equipment data reporting, providing real-time capability and
shortfall data. Finally, Nauta & Ward recommended a new instruction providing
standardized guidance and administration of test equipment.
The authors concluded that many of the ongoing field-level employment
challenges of test equipment could be mitigated by management changes. Many of the
same recommendations from 1975 and 1985, including comprehensive documentation,
12

central management, data reporting, and written policy, are echoed by AvSE managers
today.
An AFIT student, Bradie Williams (1991), examined the acquisition process of
support equipment. He found that the Air Force has traded the necessary support
equipment for additional airframes during major acquisition buys. As a result, while the
larger fleet may be attractive on paper, the actual capability is much smaller due to a lack
of required equipment. In other words, the Air Force shortsightedly eliminates expensive
support equipment in favor of a few more aircraft, hamstringing maintenance efforts
before the new weapon becomes operational.
Williams (1991) also concluded that the fluid political nature of acquisition
management leads PM’s to make decisions that are not in the best interest of the
warfighter. The amount of money involved in the development and fielding of a new
airframe is inherently political, leading acquisition professionals to take actions that run
counter to their actual goals of producing lethal, cutting edge systems (Williams, 1991).
Compounding the unstable nature of the American political system’s influence on
the acquisition process, Williams points to Puckett’s Law as another variability source
(1991). Puckett’s Law states that given the constants of cost, weight, and reliability, a
system’s capability can be expected to advance by a factor of two each year. During the
complicated and lengthy process of weapon system design, the changing nature of the
technology itself causes an endless possibility of updates and changes. Each time the
technology mutates, support equipment redesign may be necessary. Often, this results in
support equipment design late in the acquisition process, forced to “play a game of catch-
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up and…never quite succeeding” (Williams, 1991). These updates are expensive, and the
end product likely has not caught up with the final capabilities of the weapon system.
Furthermore, Williams’ thesis identified the ever-increasing bureaucratic and cost
processes as root causes of acquisition obstacles. He made the poignant prediction: “if the
trend continues…by the year 2000…not a single weapon system [will be] procured. Total
control results in total immobility” (Williams, 1991). He found that the support
equipment acquisition process’s failings are representative of the greater DoD system and
often results in unreliable, late-to-need, incomplete, and wastefully expensive programs.
He concluded by asserting that only expert adherence to the acquisition process could
produce the desired end-state of fully-supported weapons systems.
Another AFIT student, Captain Michael Bayer (2003), conducted a study
investigating the impact of AGE management concepts, quantity available, and aircraft
numbers on a unit’s ability to maximize sortie production. Conducted during the
transition towards “right-sized” Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) Unit Type Code (UTC)
packages, he validated a methodology for calculating the impact of AGE assets on a
flightline.
The project utilized Scalable Integration Model for Objective Resource Capacity
Evaluations (SIMFORCE) to simulate sortie production capabilities. Focused on seven
pieces of CSE, Capt Bayer explored two methods of homestation AGE management—
pooled centrally and allocated by unit. Central management resulted in a single pool of
resources shared by the local flying units; allocated management dedicated specific
pieces of equipment to each unit. By adjusting the number of aircraft deployed in his
simulations, he quantified the impact of AGE resources available to each flying unit. He
14

concluded that the management style of AGE while operating under the AEF concept
impacts sortie generation (Bayer, 2003). This paper, one of the first attempts to quantify
the importance of AvSE on the Air Force mission, provided strong evidence that different
management techniques produce different levels of mission generation.
Another research paper, written by Lieutenant Colonel Shane Barrett (2015),
discussed the role of high-demand, low-density support equipment in contingency
planning. His paper details the history of support equipment from the Wright Brothers in
1909 through the development of the F-35. Lt Col Barrett reviews the influence of the
Cold War on the Air Force mission and structure, noting the careful planning of SE
numbers and location. To ensure victory against an attack by the Soviet Union, the Air
Force recognized the need for proper logistical support (Barrett, 2015).
However, the fall of the Soviet Union initiated a significant drawdown of the Air
Force, both in size and budget (Barrett, 2015). The posture of support equipment
resources was reduced significantly, no longer needed by the leaner fleet of active-duty
aircraft. Since the cuts of the 1990s, the Air Force has developed a dependency upon
contract logistics support (CLS) to provision SE for new airframe acquisitions.
Subservient to CLS resources, legacy CSE does not benefit from modernization efforts,
collapsing under the continued pressure to execute the mission. As a result, SE fleets are
more specialized, less agile, and less available (Barrett, 2015).
To counter the decline of CSE, Lt Col Barrett argues that cuts to SE funding must
be considered carefully. Higher priority must be given to SE sustainment, necessitating a
paradigm shift by the planning community. SE availability is no longer guaranteed, and
must not be treated by planners as a readily-available asset. His paper provides insight
15

into the changes to the Air Force mission since the dawn of military aviation, and outlines
the recent problems caused by CSE funding cuts.
Capt Jason Leighton focused his AFIT thesis on the impact of CSE on Aircraft
Availability (AA) (2017). He argued that the maintenance community struggles to adjust
CSE authorizations or justify resource requirements due to a lack of quantifiable impact
on AA. Recognizing the fleet’s aging nature, coupled with reduced reliability, Capt
Leighton blames the FY13 CSE funding deficit of $1.24 billion on the inability to draw a
direct link between the equipment and AA (Leighton, 2017). Through a case study
methodology observing six F-16 bases, the author examined two flying metrics, the
flying schedule, and support equipment levels and authorizations, among other selected
indicators.
After collecting the data, the author performed a quantitative analysis to
determine the specific link between CSE and AA. Of note, the study initially focused on
six pieces of equipment, three of which were AGE and three of which were Automatic
Test Systems (ATS). However, due to a lack of availability of Integrated Maintenance
Data System (IMDS) data, only the ATS items were studied: Environmental Control
System Test Set (ECS Tester), Joint Services Electronic Combat Systems Tester (JSECT
Tester), and TTU-205 Pressure-Temperature Tester (205 Tester).
During his data collection, Capt Leighton noted the difficulty he experienced
gathering equipment data. The author used Precision Measurement Equipment
Laboratory (PMEL) Automated Management System (PAMS) records to calculate the
three selected pieces of test equipment’s availability—a lengthy, labor-intensive process.
The need for a consolidated equipment data system was a key finding of his study. The
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results of his quantitative analysis failed to show any direct link between CSE and AA;
however, his qualitative analysis presented strong evidence of a link.
During his interviews, respondents indicated a strong motivation to execute the
flying mission, overcoming equipment shortfalls through methods not captured in the
available data. As a result, the other key finding of Capt Leighton’s study was that the
maintenance community consistently overcame equipment shortfalls to execute the
mission—inadvertently masking the true state of the equipment and its impact on the
mission. Further obscuring the data, all six units pieced components together from
unserviceable units to make serviceable sets (a practice known as Frankensteining) while
carrying aircraft Partially Mission Capable (PMC). Because PMC aircraft do not impact a
unit’s AA rate, the study could not conclude that the three selected pieces of equipment
directly impacted a unit’s ability to execute the flying mission during FY16 (Leighton,
2017). However, through Capt Leighton’s attempt to validate Capt Bayer’s (2003)
qualitative link between AvSE and mission capability, he highlighted the need for better
data management and provided the foundation for another AFIT thesis.
MSgt Benjamin Bobic (2018) explored Capt Leighton’s claim that maintenance
culture obscured the true state of the AvSE fleet, coining the term “Flightline Heroics.”
Seeking to quantify the impact of Frankensteining, MSgt Bobic studied the impact on a
technician’s time and metric availability to recommend additional metrics for tracking.
His research focused on the same three pieces of CSE ATS as Capt Leighton (JSECT,
ECS, TTU205) and employed a case study methodology to explore technician impact
(Bobic, 2018).
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The author requested the six test bases submit spreadsheets documenting
equipment sign-out, time-in-use, and corrective action times to collect data. Due to low
participation rates, a small time-window, and minimal available data, the study could not
quantify the impact of CSE on a technician’s time. The study concluded with two
recommendations: increased CSE metrics tracking and more proactive CSE management
(Bobic, 2018). Though Bobic’s methodology was unable to support a direct quantitative
link between AvSE and mission generation, his work was the third attempt to validate the
relationship.
Summary
This chapter opened with a summary of the current national and Air Force
priorities, establishing the need to present a modern, flexible force to peer-level
adversaries. Applicable Air Force Instructions then provided the policy directives urging
the acquisition of common, cost-effective support equipment. Studies from 1975 and
1985 insisted the Air Force AvSE fleet was headed for failure, calling for comprehensive
documentation, central management, data reporting, and written policy. Papers from 1991
and 2015 described an acquisition process that overlooks AvSE, leading to large fleets of
aircraft struggling to meet their intended levels of readiness due to insufficient
equipment. Three authors, in 2003, 2017 and 2018, attempted to quantitatively link AvSE
health to mission generation, and provided some evidence for that link. The review of the
AvSE research over the last 45 years highlighted both the vital role of Air Force support
equipment and a consistent history of managers and researchers demanding reform.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methodology selected to analyze the
obstacles to CSE modernization. The section will begin with a discussion of the research
scope, followed by an introduction of the two texts used to guide the research design. The
chapter then covers the processes of data collection and data analysis, and concludes by
explaining the steps taken to ensure the validity and reliability of the data.
Research Scope
The overview of CSE literature in Chapter II provided sources demonstrating the
vital role CSE plays in the mission of the Air Force. Without reliable CSE in sufficient
numbers, the process of aircraft regeneration grinds to a halt. This research builds upon
that foundation which establishes the vital role of CSE, and seeks to enumerate specific
obstacles to modernization in support of General Brown’s Action Order D. Additionally,
this research focuses on CSE modernization, without focusing on the routine AvSE
management tasks. The obstacles explored by the research questions hinder efforts to
modernize through the procurement of “new-new” CSE, as discussed in Chapter I.
Methodology—A Qualitative Analysis
The methodological approach employed was primarily informed by two texts:
Research Design by John Creswell and Practical Research by Paul Leedy and Jeanne
Ellis Ormrod. Due to the complexity of the CSE modernization process, a qualitative
approach was selected. With no previous attempts to model the problem and only a rough
idea of the obstacles, a qualitative study best aligned with the texts’ recommendations.
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Comprised of many dimensions and layers, this study focuses on what needs to be
explored by Air Force leaders to effect modernization.
To the greatest extent possible, the research was performed in the natural setting
of CSE modernization, in the offices, conference calls, and visits to the organizations
responsible (Creswell, 2014). However, due to COVID-19, most interviews had to be
conducted over the phone. The researcher was the key instrument of data collection;
questionnaires were not used (Creswell, 2014). Data were collected from as many sources
as possible, including interviews, documents, training materials, and electronic
presentations (Creswell, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).
The constant comparative method was employed at all stages of the research
process. This method, an iterative process moving between data collection and data
analysis, allowed the researcher to refine and scope the inquiry through the course of the
project (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). An inductive and deductive data analysis process was
employed, working back and forth through collected data to classify themes, determining
if other data fit into those themes while identifying areas where more data collection were
required (Creswell, 2014). Though this process cannot identify cause-and-effect
relationships, the themes identified provide areas of focus to leaders desiring change
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).
Finally, a qualitative study was chosen to take advantage of three strengths
identified by Leedy & Ormrod: multifaced description, verification, and problem
identification (2015). Through a multifaced description, the complex nature of CSE
modernization was explored. Verification was used to test the validity of the sponsor’s
claim that significant obstacles impede modernization. Finally, through the process of
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problem identification, this work intends to inform Air Force leadership about the
changes required to modernize one of the Service’s most important assets.
After selecting a qualitative approach, a grounded theory research design best met
the needs of the research questions. The grounded theory approach starts with the data
available and builds a theory based on that data (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). In this case,
large amounts of data were available, and no other research had formed a theory about
CSE modernization obstacles.
Due to the flexibility offered by the grounded theory approach, techniques were
borrowed from the ethnography and phenomenological study methodologies.
Ethnographies study entire groups, including their cultures, interactions, beliefs, and
processes (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). This study was focused on the interactions between
members of the organizations responsible for modernization, though not culturally or
anthropologically. Because modernization requires repeated interactions between
different organizations, key informants, and participant observation provided insight into
modernization processes. Participant observation allowed the researcher to witness
recurring meetings and interactions, while key informants within the community
provided clarification and context to the observations (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).
Phenomenological study techniques were also utilized—observing people’s
perceptions of a situation. Seeking to understand how people feel about modernization,
mostly unstructured, lengthy interviews utilized a few, carefully selected set of
participants, all with direct experience of the modernization process and its sophistication
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). Participants were selected based on the recommendations of
the sponsor, and triangulated with the recommendations of two other key informants.
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Most organizations included interviews with both military leadership and civilian
managers.
Based on grounded theory development and augmented by techniques from
ethnographical and phenomenological approaches, the constant comparative method was
applied to build a compelling picture of the obstacles faced by those responsible for CSE
modernization in the Air Force.
Data Collection
The primary method of data collection employed was the use of interviews and
informed by the aforementioned texts. Each interview started with the same three
questions, with the rest of the conversation mostly unstructured.
Experts were selected based on current or recent experience with CSE
modernization, including headquarters policy and management, finance, acquisition,
lifecycle management, research, and employment, as well as one member of the Air
National Guard. During this thesis, the names of the individuals interviewed will not be
disclosed. Certain documents will be credited to their authors, with prior permission.
Most data were kept confidential to minimize the risk of reprisal and encourage
transparency.
As necessitated by the approach described in Leedy and Ormrod (2015), the data
collection of documents, presentations, slides, and training materials all contain the
perspectives of the members of the group. Additionally, only data that was accurate and
consistent with the research questions were included, ensuring validity. All data were
evaluated for consistency with the patterns revealed to maintain reliability.
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Triangulation was also employed to validate the consistency and credibility of
data (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). This approach collects multiple forms of data from
multiple sources. The data were also collected over a 1-year period, from January of 2020
through January of 2021, and included multiple visits, trips, phone conversations, emails,
and observations. A discriminant sampling of SMEs built a thorough picture of the
obstacles to modernization (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). Due to the presence of a power
hierarchy, samples of data were taken from multiple points within the organization
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). By sampling diverse contexts and situations, triangulation was
utilized to validate the consistency and credibility of observations and interview findings.
Finally, consensus was sought by providing the study results to the sponsor before
completion for clarification and review.
The use of a rigorous process of long-term, consistent data collection, utilizing
established techniques developed by leading research-design experts ensured the validity
and the reliability of the data collection process.
Data Analysis
The data analysis process was also informed by the two Creswell, Leedy, and
Ormrod texts, primarily executed through the constant comparative method. Additionally,
Creswell’s data analysis spiral was utilized in an iterative process. The spiral starts with
(1) the organization of data, followed by (2) a review of the data for pattern identification
and exploration, then the (3) identification of themes and categories in the data,
concluding with (4) the summarization of the interpretation of the data (Leedy & Ormrod,
2015).

23

After an interview was completed, the conversation notes were transcribed into a
document and then coded based on patterns in the responses. The responses were then
categorized by subject and organized by topic. After five interviews, a start list of
categories was used, with five themes selected as critical obstacles to modernization
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). As patterns in the coded responses were identified, they
pointed towards a natural progression of events, further clarifying the obstacles (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2015). Outliers, exceptions, and contradictions were also noted. Finally, the
coded data were converted into cycles of obstacles and interpreted through flowcharts
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).
As with any qualitative study, the author considered the potential biases he
brought to the analysis. As an Air Force officer, some of the interview responses may
have been affected due to a perceived rank or power gap. To overcome this barrier,
before each interview, the academic nature of the research was clarified and the
respondent was assured of complete confidentiality.
Another potential bias stemmed from the author’s primary professional
experience as an Aircraft Maintenance Officer. Reflexivity, a researcher’s influence on
the outcome of a study due to background, must be addressed to ensure the validity and
reliability of the findings (Creswell, 2014). Experience with CSE on the flightline,
backshop, and deployed all formed a context that had to be considered. To overcome this
potential bias, only the words and ideas of the interviewees were used as data sources.
Finally, the research sponsor also provided a source of bias. As a significant data
source, the sponsor coordinated many of the initial interviews and is highly motivated to
uncover and address obstacles to the modernization process. To address this bias, the
24

sponsor’s data was triangulated with other data sources to ensure validity and reliability
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).
Summary
This chapter discussed the scope of the research, focusing on the obstacles to CSE
modernization and relying on the work of other scholars to establish the gravity of the
need to maintain a reliable fleet. The chapter also discussed the chosen qualitative
methodology, primarily informed by two texts by Creswell, Leedy, and Ormrod.
Employing techniques from grounded theory studies, data validity and reliability were
ensured through triangulation and the constant comparative method. Finally, the data was
coded and organized by theme, and analyzed with the potential biases of the author and
sponsor in mind.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
The previous chapters established the urgent need for the Air Force to modernize
the current CSE fleet, detailing examples of waste, reviewing national and Air Force
policy, and summarizing significant CSE works over the last 45 years. Chapter III
explained the methodological rigor applied to this research, and Chapter IV will provide
the analysis of those results. This chapter is organized into three sections, one for each
research question. As discussed in Chapter III, these results are the expressed opinions of
interviewed Subject Matter Experts, and names have been withheld to protect the
integrity of the work and their responses.
Analysis and Results
RQ 1: What are the top five obstacles to Common Support Equipment modernization?
The five themes that SME’s expressed as obstacles to CSE modernization were
Inadequate Resources, Administrative Structure, Acquisition Management,
Communication Breakdowns, and Competing Cultures. The five obstacles identified by
the interviewed experts each contribute to failed efforts to modernize.
Inadequate Resources
The first obstacle to CSE modernization identified through the data collection
process was a lack of resources; both funding and manpower. The current state of CSE
sustainment, or the management and purchase of “new-old” equipment, is dire. Managers
responsible for the life cycle management of the support equipment fleet estimate a $2
billion disconnect between current funding and sustainment needs. Triad members
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estimate $150 million is needed annually to prevent on-hand assets from critically
degrading below 75% of authorization levels. To bring current assets back to approved
authorizations, $250 million to $300 million would be needed annually for the next 15
years.
To understand the context and current state of neglect, an overview of AvSE
funding history is necessary. Before 2004, all sustainment of AvSE was funded through
investment funds 3010 BP12 and 3080 BP84 and was highly centralized as part of the
cumbersome Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) process. The funding process was
slow and inflexible due to significant documentation and justification required by the
Corporate Structure. In a move to accelerate the AvSE acquisition process and better
align purchases with warfighter needs, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed a
complete program overhaul.
Significant change took place in 2004, during the Air Force mission-pivot from
near-peer adversaries to counter-insurgency warfare. Congress approved an investment
budget threshold increase to $250 thousand, recategorizing 96% of the AvSE portfolio to
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding. This transfer, referred to as the Support
Equipment Transformation (SET), fundamentally altered AvSE funding and management
and produced second and third-order effects that the managers of the day did not expect.
The equipment below the $250 thousand threshold was no longer managed
centrally, but placed the sustainment responsibility with the individual MAJCOMs. The
new process would empower MAJCOMs to prioritize AvSE needs, assuming
responsibility for all planning, programming, and budgeting. This change was intended to
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streamline the budgeting process, provide flexibility during the year of execution, and
reduce the time to procure new equipment.
SET managers recognized the importance of retaining commonality,
interoperability, and standardization through centralized procurement, consolidation of
purchases, and economies of scale. However, the practical management of AvSE,
including its procurement, would remain under the Air Logistics Centers (ALC),
members of AFMC. Longer-term contracts would be managed by the ALCs and funded
by the MAJCOMs, based on the MAJCOM’s priorities. For example, an upgrade to an F15E AvSE item would require Air Combat Command (ACC) to coordinate with AFMC
and use ACC funds. This new process reduced the funding burden, but increased the
communication required to coordinate priorities and funding.
SET clarified management responsibilities for Peculiar Support Equipment (PSE),
giving individual MAJCOMs the ability to move unilaterally to implement equipment
changes. However, SET obscured CSE management lines, leaving multiple organizations
responsible for sustainment, with no clear funding source.
Between 2004 and 2007, the expensive Global War on Terror forced the Air
Force to choose which programs would be underfunded. Unclear lines of responsibility
for AvSE were clarified through Centralized Asset Management (CAM) in 2007, reestablishing a central authority to make changes to CSE with a unit cost of less than $250
thousand. Reverting to vertical management of CSE, CAM was intended to streamline
budget programming and allocation processes that the MAJCOMs had operated for the
previous three years. However, by lumping all AvSE back under one organization, the
standup of CAM caused budgeting for specific CSE items to lapse because funding lines
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for individual items were lumped together under an organization without a significant
annual budget.
AFMC was established as the lead MAJCOM for CSE, but without access to
O&M funds, could not make large financial commitments without first enlisting support
from other MAJCOMs. One-year O&M funds, primarily at the disposal of the
MAJCOMs, were too unpredictable to provide the necessary forecasting and strategy for
CSE. To make matters more complicated, a change to a CSE asset required coordination
between multiple MAJCOMs, without AFMC managers possessing any lead command
authority.
Access to funding was not wholly cut off, however. AFMC could advocate for
investment funding through the Pentagon’s Air Force Logistics (Log) Panel. Responsible
for multiple logistics priorities, the Log Panel has not frequently prioritized AvSE
modernization, as AvSE makes up only 6% of the entire logistics portfolio.
The Log Panel’s long list of competing priorities to AFMC’s CAM portfolio
made it easy to divert money away from CSE management, and resulted in a significant
annual funding decline from 2007 until 2016. The remaining budget, unable to cover the
necessary replacement of fielded items, led to multiple partial programs, gaps in on-hand
asset levels versus authorizations, and threatened the Air Force’s ability to meet
published OPLAN requirements. Critical CSE assets, including flightline generators and
munitions loaders, currently have on-hand levels below the 75% authorization line.
As a result of enterprise CSE managers’ growing concerns, the Air Force changed
CSE funding back to investment dollars in 2016. However, asset levels are so critical that
operational units must maintain exhausted equipment for cannibalization of parts. Unit
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possession of these dilapidated assets paints an inaccurate picture of the health of the
CSE fleet, allowing funding to go to other priorities due to a lack of data.
The twelve-year period without investment dollars has resulted in a CSE fleet that
cannot be fixed in a single year of FYDP planning, but must be treated as a long-term
priority. Current managers, responsible for the sustainment and purchase of “new-old”
assets, must make tough decisions, funding only a small number of the highest priority
projects each year. Without the necessary funds to fill existing CSE backorders, AFMC
managers had no funding remaining for modernization efforts.
To pursue CSE modernization projects, AFMC requires access to 3600
investment funds. AFPAM63-128, the policy governing life cycle management, allows
the modernization of a system through investment funds: “Modifications can occur
throughout the life of a system. …changes made to maintain the existing capability are
funded via the O&M appropriation while changes made to improve or upgrade the
system are funded with investment appropriations” (Department of the Air Force, 2014).
Until FY18, dedicated CSE investment funding was nonexistent. Current
procedure forces AFMC modernization projects to compete with other priorities through
the Air Force Corporate Structure. The SET and CAM policies have decimated the CSE
budget, requiring all available financial resources to be dedicated to sustaining a depleted
fleet.
The second resource preventing CSE modernization is manpower. The three
management triad members, discussed in Chapter I, are not adequately manned to
manage CSE through the product lifecycle. Presently, modernization is not an automated
process. Each of the 53,000 unique stock numbers is managed by a small team of people,
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with little to no augmentation by automated processes. Any modernization initiative
requires manpower to study existing capability, justify recommended changes, inform the
acquisition process, and manage initial fielding. While the 635 SCOW manages the basic
redistribution of assets based on asset levels and vacancies, it does not track fleet health.
Unable to manage both “new-old” and “new-new” projects with current manning levels,
CSE triad organizations spend their time addressing only the most urgent priorities.
Inadequate resources, the first obstacle to CSE modernization, have resulted in a
poorly sustained fleet of equipment. Both SET and CAM, policy initiatives designed to
streamline funding and management of SE, have been inadequate vehicles for effective
sustainment of CSE. As a result of low-priority budget allocations over fifteen years, the
CSE management triad is tasked with preventing mission failure with an expended fleet
of equipment from the 1960s and 70s. Without the manpower resources to manage both
the current fleet and plan for the fleet of the future, CSE modernization projects are often
dead-on-arrival.
Administrative Structure
The second obstacle to modernization identified through SME interviews is the
current administrative structure of CSE assets, and broken into three themes: a lack of
strategic vision and authority, enterprise management of AvSE, and data management.
Each of the three themes points to a different aspect of modernization failure in the
management structure.
When SET assigned PSE to individual SPOs, and CAM consolidated CSE under
AFMC, AvSE was left with no unifying, strategic vision or authority. In practice, each
office followed a different process for modernization. The SPOs focused only on their
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assigned weapon system, initiatives like AFWERX and Spark Tank focused on grassroots
projects, and no organization had a formal process or authority to coordinate these
efforts. Even the definition of “modernization” is not consistent, with no sole policy
governing the CSE portfolio. Though AFMC is the designated lead MAJCOM for CSE,
no Executive Agent has been designated as a full-spectrum Program Office (PO) with the
commensurate authority.
This authority vacuum enables outsized individual MAJCOM influence on the
modernization process. Because AFMC does not control the purse strings, other
MAJCOMs do not necessarily follow lead command policy, as their readiness is based on
their operations requirements, outlined in documents like AFI10-201 and AFI10-601,
subject to AFPD10-9. Chapter II discussed the SERD process and highlighted the
process’s lack of authority to force the unification of modernization efforts. Thus, without
fiscal or managerial authority, AFMC must integrate the requirements of eight other
MAJCOMs when tackling a CSE modernization project. Even when a project is in the
enterprise’s best interest, a single MAJCOM can hijack the process, blocking the linkage
of requirements and condemning the project to failure.
The second theme pointing to the current administrative structure as an obstacle to
CSE modernization is a lack of enterprise-level management of AvSE. A result of SET,
multiple links exist between the Pentagon and organizations responsible for AvSE
management. SPOs, under the influence of their lead MAJCOM, often modernize the
PSE assigned to their programs, but that money is spent in silos, with no consideration of
similar projects in the enterprise. The SERD process requires a cursory look at existing
CSE but merely recommends consolidation and does not include a requirement to
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consider existing PSE. Each SPO develops specifications based only on their own
requirements with no analysis of further applicability. No one asks, “If we spend 10%
more, could this be useful on another platform?” Triad members are often not included in
ongoing PSE modernization projects and have no vehicle to leverage procedural change
to benefit the larger fleet. Finally, because the triad works for AFMC/A4, they are often
unaware of the larger acquisition picture available to SAF/AQ, leaving the very
organizations responsible for CSE modernization out of the development process.
This lack of coordination results in an ambiguous process, short-circuiting fresh
thought, and producing ambiguous requirements. AFMC estimates that a minimum of 50
to 100 duplicative pieces of equipment are currently fielded because SPOs do not usually
coordinate modernization projects or requirements.
The third theme to emerge as a result of a faulty administrative structure was data
management. Chapter II cited multiple studies that called for improved AvSE data
management, but primary documents like the MIL-HDBK-300 have since been
discontinued. The old system designed to manage AvSE data, the Air Force Equipment
Management System (AFEMS) was not audit-ready, and the new subsystem in the
Defense Priorities & Allocation System (DPAS) designed to track the data, the
Maintenance and Utilization module, is not yet operational. As a result, no hard data
exists to support modernization. Without health and usage data, or the necessary records
to prove the impact of AvSE on either readiness or AA, no definitive link can be drawn
between failing equipment and mission execution.
Finally, the lack of adequate central data management has resulted in a significant
loss of minimum requirements documentation. The SERD is one of the documents
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containing minimum system requirements during a system’s acquisition, but no central
body has retained these documents. Often no requirements documentation exists in the
SPOs, and all requirements are maintained and furnished by the original contractor.
Managers of modernization projects are then forced to perform the arduous task of
retrieving requirements from original contractors, if the companies still exist. The current
management structure does not retain basic data to track existing stock numbers, daily
equipment utilization, or the original requirements and design specifications. Without
original minimum specifications, design functions, and requirements of the legacy
system, and all modifications and upgrades, modernization projects will not succeed.
Acquisition Management
The two themes managers identified supporting acquisition management as the
third obstacle to CSE modernization were the misalignment of incentives and existing
current policies and practices.
AvSE is part of every major weapon system acquisition (Williams, 1991). These
programs take years to develop and run concurrently, making it difficult to find a onesize-fits-all, CSE solution. The advanced weapons developed today require support
capabilities not available in the current AvSE portfolio, as the defense contractors are
keenly aware. Because modern capabilities take years to develop, by the time a weapon
system is ready for AvSE, the Air Force is years behind in the process and has nothing
new to offer.
Support Equipment provides a lucrative opportunity for a defense contractor, who
has no incentive to develop equipment compatible with multiple weapons systems. The
current policies in place require a contractor to consider existing CSE, but allow the
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company to outsmart the system, designing tolerances tight enough to preclude the use of
CSE. Because it takes a significant amount of time to prove that published requirements
are unnecessarily restrictive and benefit the contractor, most PO’s will not delay the
acquisition of a new airframe by requiring redesign to accommodate existing CSE. As a
result, every new airframe acquisition exacerbates the proliferation of PSE, procuring
highly specialized pieces of equipment to perform tasks relatively common to other
airframes.
Financial incentives also counter CSE modernization efforts. Because the expense
of restarting a production line typically precludes the Air Force from purchasing
discontinued airframes like the F-22, the Service is strongly incentivized to prioritize the
initial airframe purchase. If allowed to choose, the Air Force has historically prioritized
dedicating allocated funds to additional aircraft over the necessary equipment to operate
those aircraft. The lack of data, discussed as part of the administrative structure obstacle,
exacerbates this issue. AvSE acquisition is then deferred to a later point.
The Air Force is also strongly incentivized to progress an airframe through
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), Initial Operating Capability (IOC), and Full
Operational Capability (FOC). AvSE acquisition timelines do not naturally coincide with
airframe timelines, though each stage relies upon AvSE for success. OT&E usually
results in an early need for AvSE, as testing requirements take time to meet. Because
AvSE takes time to develop, and the Air Force has not prioritized organic modernization,
contractors are enabled to provide expensive PSE solutions. This forces the Air Force
into expensive, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or peculiar equipment that benefits the
contractors but keeps the larger program on track.
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The second theme, program management policies and procedures, also provide
obstacles to CSE modernization. Program Offices follow 63-series AFIs, which are very
narrow in scope and focus. In turn, they are directed by 10-series AFI requirements,
providing clear directives through a single lead command. These acquisition programs
are not subject to any common directives that would require consideration of CSE to
benefit the larger enterprise.
Additionally, program offices are not held responsible for their airframes’
requirements and rely heavily on AFMC for information specific to their programs.
SME’s asserted that the program offices were heavily reliant on contractors for basic
system requirements in multiple interviews. If program offices cannot provide system
requirements, the coordination necessary to accomplish a CSE modernization project
across multiple airframes faces a significant obstacle.
Finally, “rapid acquisition” policies have not been applied to all of the necessary
organizations to enable the synchronization required to modernize CSE. Without the
ability to bypass current regulations, CSE triad managers fall further behind accelerated
programs.
In summary, two aspects of acquisition management provide significant obstacles
to CSE modernization. Defense contractors are incentivized to shoehorn the Air Force
into expensive PSE decisions. Misaligned incentives prioritize purchasing additional
aircraft over the AvSE required to execute the mission. High visibility weapons systems
programs prioritize the program’s timeline over the opportunity to modernize and
consolidate AvSE. No central policy exists to enforce principles of commonality and
interoperability through CSE. Furthermore, written policy does not require program
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offices to maintain system requirements, forcing dependence on AFMC and defense
contractors. As a result of these incentives and policies, the Air Force has an everincreasing amount of expensive PSE and failed CSE modernization projects.
Communication Breakdowns
The fourth obstacle to CSE modernization, communication breakdowns, initially
appeared to be a result of the current management structure, but highlights more
pervasive failures across the enterprise. Multiple interviewees discussed examples of
communication breakdown, even when the avenues of standardized communication were
firmly established. For example, the Air Force recently hired a contractor to establish
sustainment priorities for an airframe’s AvSE. Using survey research, the contractor
determined which pieces of AvSE most urgently required replacement or upgrade. This
contract is a symptom of a communication breakdown between end-users and those
responsible for AvSE sustainment. Air Force organizations should not be reliant upon an
outside contractor to mediate the communication of priorities and requirements.
Additionally, though the Log Panel has multiple competing priorities, an avenue
of modernization funding has always existed for AvSE. For over fifteen years, CSE
managers have been told that their modernization needs are not critical enough to warrant
the Log Panel’s attention. Poor communication has resulted in an inaccurate Corporate
Structure perception of the actual state of CSE. Interviewees described a disconnect
between the critical nature of AvSE in the chain-of-supportability of mission-generation,
and Corporate Structure consideration of CSE priorities. Without effective
communication, the Corporate Structure assumes adequate levels of AvSE and directs
funding to more urgent priorities.
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Finally, minimal communication occurs between the innovative branches of the
Air Force. Organizations like AFWERX, Spark Tank, the Agile Battle Lab (ABL), the
Air Guard/Air Reserve Test Center (AATC), and AvSE triad members have rarely
communicated about ongoing projects. Without coordination of requirements and triad
involvement, even the most promising modernization initiatives will not succeed.
Communication breakdowns across the enterprise have precluded the success of
critical modernization projects. The breakdown of established communication channels,
inaccurate Corporate Structure perception, and an inability for innovation organizations
to work together has resulted in the CSE fleet’s current state.
Competing Cultures
Finally, three aspects of Air Force competing cultures reinforce the fifth
significant obstacle to CSE modernization. Interviewees pointed to tribalism, end-user
values, and inter-organizational distrust as cultural breakdowns.
Members of AvSE management organizations share a common perception that
tribalism affects almost every modernization initiative. Interviewees described tribalism
as the prioritization of unit goals at the expense of the priorities of other units or the
larger organization. Impacting data integrity, resource allocation, and resistance to
change, tribalism prevents organizations from sharing capability. One example cited
resistance to automation because of the effect it would have on AGE manning positions.
Other managers expressed frustration that modernization efforts are frequently obstructed
because the disruption to the status quo may empower the end-user and threaten the job
security of supporting roles at the SPO.
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Wing-level, end-user culture also provides obstacles to CSE modernization.
Dedicated to the success of the daily flying schedule, Wing exercise, or Air Tasking
Order, maintenance units possess an unmatched capability to employ assigned resources
to execute the mission. The Aircraft Maintenance community lives by a “no-fail”
credence, determined to regenerate aircraft against all odds. Defective AvSE is
cannibalized, temporarily repaired, Frankensteined together, or replaced with COTS
solutions using Wing O&M funds.
However, this patriotic dedication produces an obstacle to CSE modernization.
Wing exercises, intended to highlight areas of weakness, become drills in “simulated”
equipment, leading to the assumption that required resources are available to execute the
mission. When a unit “simulates” the use of equipment that would not be available in a
wartime scenario, the sorties produced during the exercise are not a true picture of
capability. As a result, capability gaps are not highlighted because leaders are unwilling
to let their organizations fail due to equipment. When the mission never fails because of
equipment, the Corporate Structure does not understand the link between AvSE and the
mission. In times of war, American patriotic dedication overcomes incredible odds, but
during peacetime exercises and training missions, obscuring the state of CSE threatens
future success.
Finally, inter-organizational distrust reinforces cultural obstacles to CSE
modernization. Each of the primary management organizations responsible for AvSE
expressed a perception that top Air Force leaders would rather trust grassroots efforts
over the expertise of those tasked to modernize. But without expert guidance, grassroots
efforts usually result in solutions focused on a single problem. Therefore, funds are
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dedicated to AFWERX and Spark Tank ideas with minimal consideration of the larger
picture.
In summary, critical aspects of Air Force culture create obstacles to CSE
modernization. Tribalism intended to protect job security undermines effective
communication and trust, “Flightline Heroics” obscure the true nature of their
organization’s capability, and organizations focused on grassroots innovation efforts are
considered more trustworthy than triad members.
Obstacle Cycles
The five obstacles identified by the interviewed experts work in cycles to thwart
even the most well-articulated and justified modernization efforts. It is necessary to note,
not all modernization fails are necessarily wrong. In some cases, the different
organizations provide much-needed checks and balances to counteract stove-piped
thinking. However, this study focuses on the obstacles to genuine modernization
requirements.
Figures 1-3 provide typical examples of modernization obstacles but do not map
the modernization process completely. They should be interpreted as examples rather
than the definitive root causes of every CSE modernization project failure.
Figure 1 provides a visual flowchart of the actions a field unit must take after
identifying a CSE modernization need. Dashed boxes illustrate a transfer of
organizational responsibility for a CSE modernization project. Failed modernization
efforts, illustrated by the dotted boxes, contain one or more of the five obstacles
identified during this research.
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Figure 1: Field Level Modernization
Both the WST at the owning MAJCOM and innovation cells provide
modernization avenues to the field, but neither can affect CSE change without assistance
from AFMC. AFMC plays the central role in every CSE modernization project. If a
genuine modernization requirement does not succeed for any reason, the field is driven to
circumvent the process with local solutions. Because the field-level units are highly
motivated to prevent mission failure, rejection or dismissal of a genuine CSE
modernization need will result in the unit procuring COTS equipment, further
exacerbating the problem and obscuring the actual state of CSE.
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Figure 2: AFMC Modernization Actions
The above figure, AFMC Modernization Actions, provides an approximation of
the actions available to triad organizations to execute a modernization project. The
coordination required to modernize a CSE asset is considerable, and each step may be
impeded by one of the five obstacles identified by interviewees. This process is
characterized by AFMC, the organization primarily tasked with the sustainment of CSE,
faced with inadequate authority, policy, and resources to achieve change successfully. In
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the unlikely chance AFMC’s coordination efforts are successful, the modernization
project enters the Acquisition Process in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Acquisition Process
The approximation of the acquisition process in Figure 3 is intended to highlight
two findings. The first is that a successful CSE modernization project requires significant
coordination by AFMC before the process even begins. The second finding is illustrated
by the upper branch of the decision tree. In this branch, the Air Force initiates the
development and purchase of a new airframe or weapon system. AvSE, a critical link in
the Integrated Product Support (IPS) Elements for logistics support, must be included
with the purchase. However, current acquisition policy and practice overlooks PSE
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resources in the current inventory, and enables the contractor to force the Air Force into
no-win decisions. In most recent cases, the Air Force had to choose between delaying a
major acquisition program and purchasing expensive, duplicative pieces of PSE.
The above figures illustrate two key findings of this study: modernization projects
face more obstacles than paths to success, and AFMC is central to every successful
project. Without significant coordination, the identification of a modernization need by
the field usually leads to PSE proliferation or “Flightline Heroics.”
The interviews, documents, and reports collected to answer Research Question 1
were categorized into five categories: Inadequate Resources, Administrative Structure,
Acquisition Management, Communication Breakdowns, and Competing Cultures. Each
obstacle compounds upon the others to render most CSE modernization efforts as
failures. These obstacles are usually not a result of a poor work ethic or laziness, but
emerge from each organization’s different policies, incentives, and cultures. The data
collection process uncovered hard-working, patriotic Americans who were frustrated by
obstacles and forced into repetitive cycles that usually resulted in failure to modernize.

RQ 2: What are the consequences to the Air Force mission and objectives due to those
obstacles?
After identifying the five obstacles to CSE modernization, interviewees were
asked to discuss the probable consequences of a failure to modernize. The responses were
categorized into three themes: Agility, Financial Waste, and Mission Surety. These
themes provide examples of the consequences of the identified obstacles. This thesis does
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not attempt to adjudicate each situation, but provides patterns of the consequences of
modernization failures.
Agility
The first consequence of failed CSE modernization is degraded Air Force agility.
As the Global War on Terror has drawn to a close, the NSS and NDS have refocused the
DoD on preparing for conflict with peer-level adversaries. Unlike the dominance the Air
Force has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War, technologically advanced adversaries
will not allow the use of superbases, quickly disrupting our predictable supply chains and
logistics tails. As American rivals grow in power, the Air Force must adopt a lighter
footprint. Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the Air Force response to the call for
agility, demands a large reserve of reliable, flexible prepositioned equipment. Every
AvSE manager interviewed asserted that the current fleet of CSE is insufficient for this
type of warfare. Three former MAJCOM-level planners cited AvSE as the biggest
impediment to large-scale warfare, because of the amount of airlift required to deploy the
required equipment.
Equipment footprints and airlift requirements provide the biggest impediment to
adaptive basing concepts. The Service’s newest fighter, the F-35, is supported almost
exclusively with PSE. This means a small forward-deployed contingent of F-22s, F-15Es,
and F-35s would each require significant airlift, supported by duplicative equipment
items without any interoperability. The current, highly-specialized AvSE footprints
preclude any practical ability for fighter fleets to operate in true expeditionary nature.
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Financial Waste
The second consequence of a failure to modernize CSE is significant financial
waste. The annual nature of O&M funds forces Program Offices to participate in
expensive catch-up projects during airframe modifications and other targets of
opportunity. Long-term funds have not been available to provide predictable, stable
planning in order to clarify requirements and reduce cost. In many cited cases,
modernization projects used money earmarked for other essential purposes, diluting both
projects’ effectiveness.
The five obstacles to CSE modernization also produce a proliferation of PSE and
duplicative equipment items. Subject matter experts described examples of equipment
that perform identical tasks but only interface with a specific aircraft. Another example
cited duplication of indoor and outdoor equipment, forcing the enterprise to sustain two
unique products because of a lack of coordination during these items’ procurement. In a
final example of financial waste, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) resources were
dedicated to testing power pull requirements on legacy airframes because the basic
system requirements data no longer existed. Catch-up contracts, duplicative equipment,
and missing requirements data provide three examples of financial waste as a result of the
five modernization obstacles.
Mission Surety
The final theme identified as a consequence of failed CSE modernization is
mission surety, defined by this thesis as “the confidence of mission success.” AvSE
managers understand the cybersecurity vulnerabilities inherent to outdated equipment
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operating in a modern environment. Without proper research and coordination, CSE may
be exploited by an adversary.
Even more troubling, AvSE managers feel that key Air Force decision-makers
likely do not understand the growing capability gap of the current CSE fleet. As a result
of unclear or nonexistent AvSE policy, the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)
contains highly subjective, unstandardized CSE status reports. MAJCOM managers
reported a disconnect unit equipment requests for support, and DRRS report contents.
These reports often obscure the current status of assigned CSE assets, as units lack clear
guidance for AvSE status reporting.
Finally, decentralized management of AvSE results in hoarding. Units do not trust
AFMC’s ability to backfill reallocated equipment and are concerned that turned-in
equipment impedes a unit’s ability to execute their assigned mission. As a result,
equipment is hoarded, stockpiled, and pillaged, decreasing the effectiveness of the larger
mission.
The consequences of CSE modernization failures are dire. While the loss of
American lives may sound hyperbolic, interviewees each expressed concern that AvSE is
a blind spot, and will soon degrade each of the nine of the twelve Air Force core
functions discussed in Chapter I. In the words of one planning expert: “We don’t have the
stuff that we need, and the stuff we do have isn’t ready.”

RQ 3: What actions should Air Force policy-makers take to address those obstacles?
To address the identified obstacles and catalyze CSE modernization, SMEs
identified three categories of changes that policy-makers should make. These three
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categories, Policy, Resource, and Cultural Changes, all reside within the scope of control
of various management organizations. Many of these changes are currently in
development by the triad organizations, but require Corporate Structure support to
achieve successful implementation. These proposed actions originate from AvSE
management experts, and are not primarily attributable to the author.
Policy Changes
The first policy change recommended to Air Force leaders is the establishment of
written, enterprise-level guidance for AvSE management. Akin to AFI21-101 for Aircraft
Maintenance and AFI24-302, a 21-series AvSE AFI would fill the current void by
standardizing definitions and modernization processes, providing a standard, objective
AvSE DRRS report, and giving AFMC lead command authority. The new policy would
also give SPOs a mandate to modernize and consolidate CSE, reducing PSE proliferation
and eliminating equipment duplication. This instruction would align AvSE management
with the directives of the NSS, NDS, and Air Force policy.
The second recommended policy action was an enterprise-wide sprint to
document airframe requirements. Across the Air Force, basic technical specifications and
requirements should be recorded for every airframe and maintained independently of
their original contractors. This effort would take tremendous manpower but pay
dividends during future sustainment efforts. Led by requirements professionals in the A5
and A8 communities, documented requirements would catalyze mission surety. The
result of this sprint would be Program Offices providing single sources of data as
designed.
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One interviewee recommended the realignment of the triad under Air Force
Acquisition, giving AvSE managers insight into future programs and priorities. In some
ways, CSE modernization shares more similarity with the Acquisition Community than
the Logistics Community. This expert argued that organizational links to the needs of the
fighter, bomber, mobility, ISR, and weapons acquisition communities would enable
modernization efforts. Established lines of coordination would facilitate requirements
sharing, enabling the alignment of AvSE requirements under one CSE solution.
A policy requiring a reduction in equipment footprint size, both in size and
quantity, may also drive an increased focus on CSE modernization. The ACE mission
demands flexibility, but lacks the written policy to change the tactical reality of PSE
proliferation.
These policy changes should be undertaken to clarify roles and responsibilities,
carefully avoiding creating additional bureaucratic processes to deter progress. As CSE
modernization programs succeed, the Air Force will offer more common capabilities,
bypassing many of the identified obstacles.
Resource Changes
To overcome current obstacles to CSE modernization, managers also
recommended resource changes. Financial stability is a critical foundation to CSE
modernization and requires a reliable source of funding. Under the Log Panel,
modernization advocates should have access to an influential champion, equivalent in
rank to other critical programs. Directly enabling nine of twelve Core Functions, CSE
needs a dedicated representative singularly focused on portfolio requirements. HAF and
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Congressional leaders need to understand the dire condition of AvSE and dedicate
reliable funding to avoid mission failure.
Policy changes empowering and tasking AFMC with modernization authority
should be coupled with the necessary manpower to execute that tasking. Current
manpower levels are unable to balance both daily management and future priorities
effectively. To better understand the current need, a manpower study of the MAJCOM
should be accomplished.
A final resource change suggested by one interviewee was the standup of an
experimentation cell within AFRL. This new team could partner with AFIT and AFMC,
both collocated at Wright-Patterson AFB, to work with industry to develop organic CSE
solutions. Tasked explicitly with the development of common solutions, the new AFRL
cell would possess both inside-access to the Air Force mission and direct lines of
communication with industry partners.
Culture Changes
The third category of actions to counteract modernization obstacles would require
cultural changes. Interservice cross-talk should not only occur in locked vaults, but
acquisition and sustainment managers should have open lines of communication within
the DoD. For example, the Marines, famously expert at expeditionary operations, could
inform Air Force AvSE managers during the current pivot to adaptive basing. One
manager described how the Army has standardized “6T” battery technology, presenting
attractive applications for Air Force AvSE. Air Force managers of all types should
emulate the Operations Community’s integration with sister services.
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Another cultural change must take place within the Air Force Acquisition
Community. For rapid aircraft acquisition to be successful, AvSE managers must be
considered and included in the early stages of program development. The current lack of
ability to provide input results in vague requirements, late-to-need equipment, and the
proliferation of expensive, highly-specialized AvSE.
Finally, field-level logisticians must be willing to accept mission failure under key
training conditions to highlight the true nature of the AvSE fleet. The culture of
“Flightline Heroics” has allowed the United States total air dominance for the last 30
years but threatens future mission success. Without an accurate picture of capability gaps,
resources are misallocated. For the mission to succeed in the future, it must be allowed to
fail today.
The proposed policy, resource, and culture changes do not address every aspect of
the identified obstacles but would provide practical steps toward a robust, flexible fleet of
CSE. Air Force policy-makers have the power to overcome the five CSE modernization
obstacles through policy, resource, and cultural changes.
Summary
This chapter discussed the results of the data collection process described in
Chapter III. The opinions and views of the interviewed SMEs were categorized into five
obstacles to CSE modernization: Inadequate Resources, Administrative Structure,
Acquisition Management, Communication Breakdowns, and Competing Cultures.
Research Question Two uncovered the dire consequences of a pattern of CSE
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modernization failures. Finally, Research Question Three summarized the proposed
Policy, Resource, and Cultural changes to Air Force decision-makers.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions of Research
The $13 billion Common Support Equipment portfolio directly impacts national
security by enabling nine of the twelve Air Force Core Functions. Critically out-of-date,
the fleet’s $2 billion disconnect between current capability and authorized levels has
provided a moment of reckoning for AvSE managers. Unable to effectively manage both
sustainment and modernization of CSE, insufficient resources have forced AFMC into
crisis management.
Subject Matter Experts from Headquarters Air Force, Air Force Materiel
Command, Pacific Air Forces, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, the Air
National Guard, the Air Force Research Laboratory, Acquisition Program Managers, and
individual System Program Offices and Weapon Systems Teams identified five obstacles
to CSE modernization: Inadequate Resources, Administrative Structure, Acquisition
Management, Communication Breakdowns, and Competing Cultures.
For the last fifteen years, the Resources dedicated to AvSE have decreased
dramatically, partially as a result of consolidation under Centralized Asset Management
and the Support Equipment Transformation. Starved of Investment Funds and reliant on
annual Operations and Maintenance dollars, the equipment fleet is frozen in time, unable
to both cover current needs and accomplish modernization projects. Competing priorities,
coupled with minimal managerial manpower, have relegated resources to a few annual
priorities, leading to a fleet-wide readiness decline.
The current AvSE Administrative Structure provides the second obstacle to CSE
modernization. A vacuum of strategic vision and authority has produced siloed spending
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and allowed Air Combat Command, Global Strike Command, Air Force Special
Operations Command, and Air Mobility Command to stonewall the development of
common solutions. The absence of enterprise-level management of AvSE blurs lines of
communication, results in ambiguous processes, and produces duplicative pieces of
equipment. The current Administrative Structure also has resulted in significant data loss.
Missing minimum system requirements, usage data, and equipment status obscure the
true state of mission capability, and deter the Corporate Structure from approving
modernization projects.
The third obstacle, Acquisition Management, obstructs modernization through the
misalignment of incentives and through current policies and practices. Acquisition
incentives, under pressure from Congress and Headquarters Air Force, prioritize
airframes on the ramp, even at the expense of the equipment required to employ those
airframes. As a result, the larger fleet has lower capability rates than a smaller, properly
equipped fleet.
The prioritization of timeliness also allows defense contractors to corner
acquisition professionals into expensive peculiar equipment solutions. Even though
AFI63-101 directs Program Managers to maximize the use of common equipment,
today’s out-of-date CSE fleet enables contractors to circumvent efforts to consolidate and
modernize equipment.
Current policies and practices in Acquisition Management counter modernization
projects by allowing Program Offices to rely on defense contractors for basic system
requirements. Furthermore, no current policy requires Program Offices to collaborate on
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CSE requirements. Acquisition Management incentives, policies, and practices must be
addressed for CSE modernization efforts to be successful.
Communication Breakdowns are the fourth obstacle to CSE modernization.
Managers cited examples of contractors facilitating communication between Air Force
organizations, when established lines of communication were unable to reach consensus.
Poor communication has resulted in a Corporate Structure impression that CSE does not
require significant resources or higher priority. Members of the AvSE management triad
expressed frustration that AFWERX, Spark Tank, and other innovation cells do not
collaborate during AvSE modernization projects, often leading to an incomplete
understanding of the requirements.
The fifth obstacle, Competing Cultures, impedes CSE modernization projects
through tribalism, values, and distrust. Hoarding capability at the local level, unit
tribalism impacts data integrity, resource allocation, and produces a resistance to change.
When units “simulate” equipment during exercises, utilizing resources that would not be
available in a wartime scenario, their no-fail culture conceals mission-capability gaps.
Finally, triad managers described interorganizational distrust; the tendency of Air Force
leaders to prefer grassroots modernization efforts over the projects originating from
AFMC.
These five obstacles have resulted in serious consequences to the Air Force’s
agility, finances, and mission. Though the aging fleet of equipment impacts day-to-day
operations on the flightline, more serious consequences lurk beneath the surface.
Operating from superbases, the force is anchored to large fleets of peculiar equipment
that preclude the agile, flexible force prescribed in the National Security Strategy and the
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National Defense Strategy. MAJCOM planners cited AvSE footprints as their single
greatest mobility concern during wartime contingency planning. Furthermore, these
obstacles have enabled the F-35 to be supported almost entirely by peculiar equipment,
sharing marginal commonality with other Air Force assets.
The obstacles to CSE modernization have also resulted in significant financial
waste. Expensive catch-up projects neglect opportunities to consolidate capability and
have produced 50 to 100 duplicative equipment items. Some of the nation’s highest
priority assets, like the E4-B, are forced into expensive work-arounds due to unreliable
AvSE. When interoperable, modern common equipment items are not available, the
acquisition of new airframes leads the Service down a path of increased AvSE cost,
complexity, and specificity through additional PSE.
The third, and most serious, consequence as a result of the five obstacles is the
erosion of mission surety. Managers of all levels of AvSE management expressed
concern that top Air Force leaders may not have an accurate sight picture of the current
state of AvSE. The absence of accurate data collection, coupled with vague AvSE policy,
have produced highly subjective, unstandardized DRRS reports. Though the Air Force
does not use DRRS reports to rate a commander’s effectiveness, remnants of past culture
discourage complete transparency. Unit tribalism and equipment hoarding further obscure
the true state of a vital link in the logistics chain. All interviewed levels of AvSE
management expressed a deep concern that CSE is an Air Force blind spot, and will soon
degrade the Service’s ability to execute its Core Functions.
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Recommendations for Action
Though CSE faces significant obstacles to modernization, and the consequences
of an outdated fleet are dire, AvSE managers were confident that focused changes to
policy, resources, and culture could adjust the current trajectory. These changes should
carefully avoid imposing additional bureaucracy and focus on the removal of roadblocks
as the Air Force “Accelerates Change” (Brown, 2020).
To overcome current obstacles, AvSE policy should by codified in a single-source
AFI, standardizing definitions and modernization processes, providing uniform data
reporting criteria, giving AFMC lead command authority, and requiring thorough
coordination during the acquisition process. Furthermore, all AvSE managers strongly
recommended that the Air Force buy the complete specifications of every item procured.
To tackle the current lack of system requirements, an enterprise-wide sprint
should document airframe requirements. Though significant manpower would be
required, the consolidation of requirements would catalyze modernization and
sustainment efforts across the force. A final policy change might also require the
reduction of equipment proliferation, reducing duplicative items and consolidating to
common equipment.
Secondly, managers recommended focused resource changes. The Air Force
Corporate Structure should be empowered to inform HAF and Congressional leaders
about the current need through improved data management and interpretation. However,
decision makes cannot afford to wait until DPAS “solves” the current lack of data.
Current AFMC manpower levels preclude concurrent management and modernization of
the 533,000 item CSE portfolio. A manpower study of AvSE management organizations
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should be accomplished, with clear delineation of roles and responsibilities. With
adequate manning, triad organizations will be better equipped to articulate CSE
requirements to the Logistics Panel.
Finally, leaders in the logistics enterprise should encourage cultural changes. The
Operations community’s admirable cross-talk with other service branches should be
emulated in both acquisitions and logistics. Marine expeditionary logistics and Army
equipment standardization hold valuable corporate knowledge often untapped by Air
Force professionals. The culture of siloed thinking should also be addressed in the
acquisition community. Though incentives reward speed and cost, each program holds
the potential to improve Air Force logistics by capitalizing on modernization
opportunities. Finally, Wing-level leaders should clearly articulate the importance of
presenting an accurate capability sight picture during exercises and status reports. No unit
wants to fail a mission-generation exercise, but to safeguard future mission surety,
capability limits and gaps must be identified today.
Future Research
The AvSE enterprise is rich with opportunities for future research. Built on the
foundation of Bayer (2003), Leighton (2017), and Bobic (2018), a quantitative link
between CSE assets and mission capability could be modeled. The impact of PSE on
airlift requirements may also provide useful insight. The five obstacles to CSE
modernization could each be explored in more detail and evaluated through a survey of
the larger logistics enterprise. One interviewee mentioned the environmental impacts of
the continued use of the A/M32-60B generator, which emits a deafening roar during use
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and consumes large amounts of fuel. The study could focus on technician health,
impediments to communication, and sustainment costs of the generator. Modernization
could be explored with a wider lens, investigating successful efforts in other Services or
Air Force organizations. Finally, a future study could focus on the detailed policy,
resource, and cultural changes necessary to enable successful modernization efforts.
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